The Euroscepticism grew and the Cohesion policy was no exception (see the Graphs below). Investments into infrastructure that were part of the policy were linked with credit booms in construction. As many of the private enterprises that received EU supports were highly indebted or even went bankrupt, it was not easy to build a positive story around these either. Even when European funds were used to address unemployment, e.g. via subsidies for self-employment, labour unions voiced criticisms, arguing that this was a neoliberal approach towards employment policy, a part of the savings dictate from the Brussels, that was in fact dismantling the welfare state. Moreover, domestic political elites trying to avoid blame for painful measures did not hesitate to point fingers at the EU.
There were also more direct links between the crisis and the Cohesion policy, ranging from delays in implementation due to lack of finance to instability in the governance structures in the period 2011-2013 as a result of political turbulence. With the crisis, existing problems of the Cohesion policy in Slovenia, such as low project sustainability (i.e. dependence on the supports), came even more affront. Finally, the total contribution of the EU funds in the new programming period 2014-2020 was reduced by €1 billion. The strongest cut was made to the financing of the small regional bottom-up projects, which in past provided for recognisability and support for the Cohesion policy in local communities.
Nevertheless, some positive things did come out of the crisis. With no money to continue with the Cohesion policy advertising campaign that was for the first (and the last) time implemented in 2009, in 2010, a decision was made to engage with experience based promotion by holding events at the sites of the investments and inviting local people to take part, thus drawing attention of media. Communication focused on particular contributions and individual experiences helped in de-linking the policy from the macroeconomic trends and structural reforms where, ironically, Cohesion policy was increasingly filling the gap left by the other policies and was consequently also taking the blame of the various policy failures.
While the Cohesion policy has an important stake in keeping the EU together, as the Slovenian case shows, it cannot and should not be seen as a mechanism for fixing all of the problems related with the asymmetrical crises. Rather than that, to avoid the expectations-capability gap, it should be based on reasonable expectations concerning specific contributions with a potential of spin offs and inspiring broader change
Marko Lovec
COHESIFY Research Fellow at Central European University
Center for Policy Studies