



COHESIFY

The impact of EU Cohesion Policy
on European Identification



Towards a regional typology of EU identification

By Marcin Dąbrowski, Dominic Stead and Bardia Mashhoodi

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Department of Urbanism, Faculty of Architecture and the Built Environment
Delft University of Technology
The Netherlands

Email address for correspondence: m.m.dabrowski@tudelft.nl



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Summary: This paper explores the linkages between the characteristics of regions and EU identification and proposes a regional typology of EU identification. Starting from a brief review of the literature on determinants of EU identification, the paper adds to it by asking questions about how these determinants operate on the regional level and how the features of regions, such as territorial, governance and socio-economic characteristics, can affect the perceptions of the EU. It then reviews the existing regional typologies and data sets to identify those that can be used to describe and explain EU identification at the regional level. Following that, the paper presents a regional typology of EU identification and applies it to describe the patterns in the regional perceptions of the EU across COHESIFY case study countries. Finally, a framework for further exploration to explain the relations between the regional characteristics and EU identification is set out.



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1 Introduction: do regional characteristics matter for EU identification?

The goal of COHESIFY project is to shed light on the ways in which EU Cohesion policy contributes to a positive identification with the European integration project, which in turn is expected to help to determine the implications for improving communication of the results of EU Cohesion policy to the European citizens. The point of departure for the project is the assumption that EU Cohesion policy can be considered as a tool that is contributing to the development of a 'sense of community' among the EU citizens as by investing funding into concrete projects across the European territory it is not only a direct and tangible expression of European solidarity but also a policy that has a direct impact on people's daily lives and their environment. One of the distinctive features of COHESIFY is that it endeavours to explore whether and how this relationship between EU Cohesion policy and EU identification varies across the wildly differentiated regions across the European territory.

This paper stems from the work conducted as part of COHESIFY Work Package 2 'Regional context, challenges and identities', and in particular its Task 2.4 which endeavours to review territorial characteristics related to EU identities and develop a territorial typology. Thus, the aim of this two-fold. First, the paper aims at exploring which characteristics of regions may determine those patterns, which in turn will prepare ground and a framework for further analysis and mapping. Second, the aim is also to shed more light on the regional patterns in EU identification by measuring it, mapping it, and ultimately, building a regional typology.

The paper's structure reflects those aims. The next section will, first, offer a brief review the literature on EU identification, linking it to the regional characteristics. Then it will review the existing typologies and data sources to single out those which can be used to analyse the regional determinants of EU identification. On that basis, it will then formulate a set of hypothesis on the relations between territorial characteristics of regions and EU identification, which will then be further qualitatively explored in case studies and later tested quantitatively (COHESIFY Output 2.4b). This will be followed a description of the methodology used to build the regional typology of EU identification and a section outlining the typology itself, together with the maps illustrating it. Then, a set of fact sheets on EU identification for the COHESIFY case study countries will be provided. Finally, the paper will close with an outline of the next steps towards further analysis to explain how territorial characteristics affect EU identification.

2 Hypotheses on factors affecting EU identification

2.1 Linking EU identification to regional characteristics

In COHESIFY's Output 2.1 (Mendez & Bachtler, 2016), a review of the literature on EU identification across several social science disciplines, from political science to sociology and European studies, was carried out, singling out a set of factors that affect European identity among the citizens.

First, these factors included **instrumental/functionalist calculations** on the costs and benefits stemming from European integration, whereby the winners of this process are more likely to view the EU in a positive light than those who lose out from this process (Bellucci, Sanders, & Serricchio, 2012; Fligstein, 2008, 2009). Against this background, it is not surprising that studies covering the period of late 1990s, when the amount of EU spending on Cohesion policy increased, indicated a positive impact of Structural Funds on the positive perceptions of the EU (Brinegar, Jolly, & Kitschelt, 2004; Osterloh, 2011) particularly among the direct recipients of funding. In fact, previous research has shown that an increase of per capita transfer from the EU to a region by 100 Euro boosts the likelihood of one being positive about the EU by approximately 5 to 15% (Osterloh, 2011). Second, there is literature indicating that **transnational experiences and social interactions across the borders can also positively affect identification with the EU** (Bellucci et al., 2012; Fligstein, 2009). Third, there are studies that indicate that **the strength of pre-existing territorial identities** at national or sub-national level also affects, either positively or negatively, European identification (Bruter, 2009; Chacha, 2013; Duchesne & Frogner, 1995; Hooghe & Marks, 2003; Marks, 1999; Medrano & Gutiérrez, 2001). Fourth, there is evidence suggesting that the lower the **trust in national political institutions** citizens have, the higher is their identification with the EU institutions which provide an alternative locus of identification in the face of dissatisfaction with the domestic institutions (Bellucci et al. 2012). Finally, literature on 'cognitive mobilisation' suggests that **socio-demographic characteristics** do play a key role as well in determining positive identification with the EU, with key factors favouring it being higher income, occupational status and educational attainment (Citrin & Sides, 2004; Duchesne & Frogner, 1995; Fligstein, 2009; Medrano & Gutiérrez, 2001). These findings seem to be related to those from studies on the Structural Funds impacts indicating that awareness of EU funding is related to socio-economic background and translated into support for the EU (Osterloh 2011); and that education level plays a mediating role in the effect of EU transfers on the perceptions of the European integration project (Chalmers & Dellmuth, 2015).

Little is known, however, about how these determinants play out at the regional level, where a significant variation on all most of those factors can be observed. What about other regional (territorial) features of regions? Do they also matter for EU identification? Finally, how does EU identification itself vary across the differentiated regional contexts across the 28 EU member states? This paper attempts to bring elements of response to these questions. Taking the above observations on the determinants of EU identification as a point of departure, it explores the regional-level variables related with the above factors and explores other regional features that may play a role in shaping the perceptions of the EU.

The first task in this process is to identify the relevant and usable typologies and data sources for those variables at the regional level. A review of these proceeds in two stages. First, a long list of potentially relevant typologies and indicators from existing data sets is identified, in attempt to match and build on the factors identified in the literature. In the second stage, the list is narrowed down to the indicators for which adequate data is available or possible to process in a way that made it usable for the COHESIFY project (e.g. EU-wide data available at the regional level). In the first stage, five groups of indicators are identified, building on the main factors identified in the literature review by Mendez and Bachtler (2016) and then adding a range of territorial indicators which may also influence EU identification.

2.2 Regional indicators that may explain EU identification

The initial search for regional level indicators identified four types of indicators (see Table 1). First, **territorial indicators**, which reflect the territorial features of the regions that may affect EU identification. In this category, among the characteristics of regions that may matter one can list the degree of urbanisation, which one can expect to affect EU identification, because it is in the cities and major metropolitan regions that highly educated and economically better off segments of the population tend to cluster. In fact, these are those groups that are more likely to see the EU in a more favourable light, as the literature explaining EU identification with socio-economic factors indicates. Conversely, inhabitants of less urbanised regions, living in intermediate or rural areas, are also likely to have a lower level of educational attainment and less favourable economic situation, thus they are less likely to have positive perceptions of the EU. In order to measure the degree of urbanisation, one can resort to indicators such as urban – rural taxonomy or the classification of metropolitan regions, with the expectation that predominantly urban and/or metropolitan regions will exhibit more positive EU identification.

A second territorial indicator of interest for EU identification is remoteness or peripherality of regions. This indicator, while also being closely related to socio-economic and educational status, with a smaller share of wealthy and well educated and potentially more pro-EU population, also relates to the instrumental / functionalist calculations on the benefits from EU Cohesion policy. In fact, as even a quick glimpse at the past EU Cohesion policy funding eligibility maps would indicate, particularly those prior to 2007, when the Eastward enlargement of the EU profoundly redefined the eligibility map, peripheral and remote regions were singled out as beneficiaries of the bulk of the EU funding, being mainly qualified among the less developed regions (or even explicitly as remote and sparsely populated areas, as was the case for the Northern regions of Sweden and Finland in 1994-1999 period). Thus, one can expect more positive attitudes towards the EU in peripheral and remote areas thanks to that substantial EU Cohesion policy's investment in infrastructure and other amenities and initiatives which is arguably more visible and tangible in a remote and underdeveloped region than it is in a central and economically leading one. Moreover, reflecting Osterloh's (2011) argument that awareness of EU-funded investment goes in hand with positive image of the EU, one could argue that, for instance, in peripheral or remote regions ERDF-supported infrastructural projects would be more

likely be well known to the population due to their pivotal role for those regions that do not typically benefit from substantial infrastructural development.

Third territorial indicator that was identified as potentially having a positive impact on EU identification in regions concerns the presence of an intra-EU border with regions being part of another EU Member State. This is in line with the positive relation between exposure to transnational experiences and positive image of the EU indicated in the literature (Bellucci et al., 2012; Fligstein, 2009). The inhabitants of regions with such an intra-EU border not only are naturally more prone and likely to interact with people across the border, but also one may add that their regions benefit from Interreg programmes, supporting cross-border cooperation projects that are likely to provide an additional dimension and/or opportunities for those transnational interactions.

Then one can single out regional indicators pertaining to **governance**, and in particular the Quality of Government (QoG) and the degree of trust in national government. Here, in line with previous studies (Bellucci et al 2012), one may expect a substitution effect, whereby the citizens who face government institutions that are of low quality and not deemed trustworthy are likely to support EU institutions instead, which are deemed more capable and reliable. That being said, one may also expect a converse mechanism, whereby regions with stronger and capable regional institutions make better use of the Structural Funds to stimulate regional development through well targeted and strategically planned investment, which in turn would have a positive impact of the perceptions of the EU.

Linking to the previous observations that the strength of national and regional identity may affect, either way, identification with the EU, one may expect that regions with strong **regional identity** are more likely to take advantage of the opportunities for regional empowerment that EU Cohesion policy may bring by boosting the powers and resources of the regional authorities through regional-level implementation of Structural Funds (Bache, 1998; Bachtler & McMaster, 2008; Bailey & Propriis, 2002; Baudner & Bull, 2013; Dąbrowski, 2014; Ferry & McMaster, 2005). For instance, Chacha (2013) found that individuals in regions with strong regional attachment, albeit an inclusive attachment, tend to support regional autonomy and also view the actions of the EU that empower the regions in a more positive light.

Finally, one can list a whole set of **socio-economic indicators** that may affect EU identification through both the effects related to the links between individual socio-economic situation and the views on European integration, as outlined in the literature (Duchesne and Frogner 1995; Medrano and Gutiérrez 2001; Citrin and Sides 2004; Fligstein, 2009, Chalmers & Dellmuth, 2015), but also through individual or collective cost-benefit calculations on the EU and its policies. First of those concerns average income levels, which coincides with the eligibility for specific EU Cohesion policy funding 'objectives', which are set, at least in theory (see Bloom & Petrova, 2013; Dellmuth, 2011; Dotti, 2016), determined in relation to the percentage of the average gross domestic product per capita.¹ Thus, while

¹ For instance, in 2007-2013 period 'Convergence' objective was reserved for regions with GDP per capita below 75% of EU average, albeit with exceptions made for 'Phasing out' regions.

poorer regions eligible for Convergence objective (2007-2013 or classified as Less developed regions (2014-2020) may have less wealthy population and thus more people who are inclined to dislike the EU, those regions also happen to benefit from more substantial allocations of EU funding, which in turn may work in the opposite direction and favour more positive image of the EU.

Another socio-economic indicator of interest is the rate of unemployment and, closely related one, the share of population living in poverty. Thus, high unemployment and poverty is expected to negatively affect the image of the EU, not least because individual economic frustration increases receptiveness to anti-EU populist discourse, currently on the rise, in particular in deindustrialising areas of Western Europe where jobs are increasingly scarce and poverty rates soar.

In order to offer a different perspective, following the trend to go beyond GDP as the main indicator of socio-economic situation, one may also consider other regional indicators that cover subjective well-being or related notions of happiness or liveability (see e.g. Helliwell, 2003; Helliwell, Layard, & Sachs, 2013). One may assume that in regions scoring high on well-being, liveability and/or happiness the citizens are more likely to have a positive image of the EU, not least because the lower frustration with their life situation would make them more immune to populist anti-EU discourses.

Then there is educational attainment, which reflects directly the observations from the abovementioned literature that more educated individuals tend to view the EU in more favourable light (Chalmers & Dellmuth, 2015). One may expect this indicator to play out in a similar way when the regional level is concerned.

Further indicators which one may expect to matter, which also relates to receptiveness to populist discourse blending anti-immigrant, xenophobic views with Euroscepticism, are demographic. Here one could include both in-migration to the region and also out-migration to other EU countries. Thus, concerning the former, one may expect that in regions with a large and growing share of immigrants, this phenomenon would face opposition from a large section of the society, causing frustration and anxiety, which, as any observer of the political events unfolding since the eruption of the still ongoing refugee crisis in Europe, is often channelled into an anti-EU sentiment, with the European integration and in particular the Schengen zone being associated with a loss of control over national borders and immigration.

That being said, concerning the later, the picture is more ambiguous as one may expect that economic out-migration, driven by precarious job and/or life situation in the home region may be seen both as a boon, for it offers opportunities for improvement of one's situation and possibly remittances being sent back home, and as a curse, because massive out-migration to richer EU Member States, as was experienced by the countries like Poland or Romania, results in a brain drain and skewed age structure, with the younger more likely to emigrate. abroad. Thus, effects of the possibility to enjoy the free movement of persons across the EU could have both a negative and a positive impact on the perceptions of the EU.

Furthermore, similarly to the peripherality or remoteness, the access that the citizens of a region have to a variety of public services is another factor that may affect the perception of the EU. In fact, in regions with low access to services, such as transport infrastructure, inhabitants may be more likely to have a positive image of the EU through Cohesion policy and notions such as territorial cohesion seeks to improve accessibility of various social services to people across all regions.

Last but not least, since EU Cohesion policy is not the only source of funding that the people across various European regions may benefit from, one could consider the share of population employed in agriculture. In fact, as Osterloh's work pointed out (2011), citizens who directly receive EU funds are much more likely to be positive about the EU, thus one should expect also positive effects on EU identification stemming from other EU's redistributive policies, such as the Common Agricultural Policy, distributing direct payments to farmers across the EU. Employment in agriculture indicator can indeed be useful in capturing this effect of being a direct beneficiary of EU transfers and control for the influence of other policies of the EU beyond Cohesion policy.

Table 2.1. Regional indicators that may affect EU identification

| Type of indicator | Indicator | Possible relation to EU identification |
|--------------------------|--|--|
| <i>Territorial</i> | Urban/rural | Socio-economic considerations – greater share of wealthy and well educated population that is more likely to identify with the EU |
| | Metropolitan regions | As above |
| | Remoteness / peripherality | Socio-economic considerations as above, but also instrumental-functionalist calculations by inhabitants of areas where EU-funded investment was more considerable and arguably more visible make positive EU identification more likely |
| | Border regions | Transnational experience – border regions benefit from EU Cohesion policy's cross-border cooperation programmes (Interreg) thus their populations are expected to increase positive identification with the EU |
| <i>Governance</i> | Quality of government (QoG) / trust in national government | Substitution effect – in regions with low QoG and low trust towards national government one can expect more positive perceptions of the EU viewed as a more credible institution than the domestic ones |
| <i>Regional identity</i> | Attachment to region | Regional empowerment through EU Cohesion policy, which may favour positive image of the EU, is more likely to be exploited by regions with stronger regional identity |
| <i>Socio-economic</i> | Income level / Structural Funds eligibility | Regions eligible for Convergence objective / Less developed regions may have less wealthy population (socio-economic considerations), however, benefit from more substantial allocations of EU funding which may favour positive image of the EU (instrumental-functionalist calculations) |
| | Unemployment / poverty | Socio-economic considerations – high unemployment and poverty may negatively affect |

| | | |
|--|---|---|
| | | the image of the EU, economic frustration increases receptiveness to anti-EU populist discourse |
| | Well-being / liveability / happiness | Socio-economic considerations – inhabitants of regions scoring high on well-being, liveability and/or happiness are likely to have more positive image of the EU |
| | Educational attainment | Socio-economic considerations – regions with more well educated inhabitants are likely to exhibit more positive perceptions of the EU |
| | Demographic trends (shrinking/growing, migration) | Socio-economic considerations - economic frustration exacerbated by in-migration increases receptiveness to anti-EU populist discourse; ambiguous but likely effects of out-migration rendered possible by the Common Market on the perceptions of the EU |
| | Access to services | Instrumental-functionalist considerations – in regions with low access to services inhabitants may be more likely to have a positive image of the EU which improves accessibility of services through Cohesion policy |
| | Agriculture (CAP) | Instrumental-functionalist considerations –large share of population employed in agriculture implies more people who directly benefit from EU funding, albeit from Common Agricultural Policy and no Cohesion policy |

Source: Authors

2.3 Review of existing typologies and data sets: towards a set of variables

On the basis of the above list of regional indicators with a potential impact on EU identifications, a review of the existing typologies and data sets available was carried out to identify the set of variables that may be used to measure them.

There were two critical selection criteria guiding this process, which led to discarding some indicators due to lack of suitable data. First, the data sets needed to include regional level data covering all EU Member States. Second, since COHESIFY focuses on NUTS 2 level, the variables selected needed to be collected at that level, or leave scope for aggregating from NUTS 3 level or disaggregating from NUTS 1 to NUTS 2. This process of disaggregation / disaggregation entails a certain bias, which has to be acknowledged, and cannot lead to meaningful results in cases of variables available for some indicators. An example of a case where aggregation would be counter-productive, was the urban-rural typology used by Eurostat, which could be used to measure the degree of urbanisation of regions, however, the variable used for this typology is based on NUTS 3 units and aggregation to NUTS 2 level would make it meaningless (e.g. aggregation would completely distort the reading of the urban-rural patterns in a NUTS 2 region containing both predominantly urban and predominantly rural types of NUTS 3 units).

Thus, the range of territorial indicators initially listed was reduced to border regions typology used by Eurostat and in the 5th Cohesion Report (DG Regio, 2010), mapping cross-border cooperation programme areas co-financed by ERDF under the European territorial cooperation objective, areas of the cross-border cooperation component of IPA (Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance); and areas of the cross-border cooperation programmes within ENPI (European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument) for the 2007-2013 period. This typology in fact was the only one for which aggregation from NUTS 3 to NUTS 2 level produced relatively meaningful results (NUTS 2 regions with a NUTS 3 region engaged in the said programmes can be deemed a region with experience in territorial cooperation across national borders), albeit with some inevitable distortion.

Table 2.2. List of available variables suitable for the analysis

| Type of indicator | Indicator | Variable | Source of data | Data coverage |
|--------------------------|---|---|----------------------------|---------------|
| <i>Territorial</i> | | | | |
| | Border regions / cross-border cooperation | Border regions: Cross-border cooperation programme areas | Eurostat (2010) | NUTS3 |
| <i>Governance</i> | Quality of Government | Quality of Government | Charron et al. 2015 (2013) | NUTS2 |
| | | Trust in national government | Eurobarometer (2015) | NUTS1-2 |
| <i>Regional identity</i> | Attachment to region | | | |
| Socio-economic | Income level / Structural Funds eligibility | Structural Funds eligibility 2007-2013, 2014-2020 | Eurostat (2016) | NUTS2 |
| | Unemployment / poverty | Unemployment rate, population at risk of poverty | Eurostat (2015) | NUTS2 |
| | Well-being / liveability / happiness | Social progress index (Basic Human Needs, Wellbeing, Opportunity) | DG Regio (2011-2013) | NUTS2 |
| | Educational attainment | Population aged 25-64 with tertiary education | Eurostat (2015) | NUTS2 |
| | Demographic trends (shrinking/growing, migration) | Crude rate of population change, crude rate of net | Eurostat (2014) | NUTS2 |

| | | | | |
|--|--------------------|---|-------------------|-------|
| | | migration | | |
| | Access to services | Typology on Social Services of General Interest | ESPON SeGI (2012) | NUTS2 |
| | Agriculture (CAP) | Share of population employed in agriculture | Eurostat (2015) | NUTS2 |

Source: Authors

2.4 Hypotheses

On the basis of the set of variables available listed in table 2.2 and the claims on what affects the citizens' position on the EU advanced in the literature, one can establish a number of hypotheses on the regional level factors of EU identification for the four groups of variables identified. Thus, for the four types of variables, one can expect more positive EU identification in the following regions:

Territorial:

- (H1) Regions with an internal border. This is due to the exposure of the citizens to interactions across the border (Interreg effect).

Governance:

- (H2) Regions with low quality of government and regions with low trust in national institutions. In both cases this is expected because of the substitution effect, whereby the locus of loyalty shifts from the national institutions, deemed incapable and untrustworthy, towards the European institutions.

Regional identity:

- (H3) Regions with stronger regional identity. This is because regions with stronger regional identity can be expected to be more pro-active in seizing the opportunities for regional empowerment that EU Cohesion policy may bring.

Socio-economic:

- (H4) Regions with greater aid intensity, because of the instrumental-functionalist calculations on the benefits of EU funding;
- (H5) Regions with lower unemployment rate and lower share of people at risk of poverty, because one can expect poor individual economic situation to fuel Euroscepticism and negative attitudes towards the EU;
- (H6) Regions with lower immigration rate, because high rate of immigration, like unemployment and poverty, is expected to boost negative perceptions of the EU, associated with free movement of persons and loss of control over national borders and immigration;

- (H7) Regions with a declining population, because these regions are likely to see their population decrease due to outmigration to work in wealthier EU Member States allowing for betterment of one's economic situation;
- (H8) Regions with higher share of population with tertiary education. This is expected because of the correlation between high educational attainment and more positive view of the EU;
- (H9) Regions with low accessibility to social services, because in these regions EU investment in infrastructure and amenities may be more tangible and perceptible by the wider public;
- (H10) Regions with high share of employment in agriculture. In this case, one expects more positive identification with the EU not in relation to EU Cohesion policy but rather due to the fact that a substantial share of population benefits from direct payments from the Common Agricultural Policy, which is likely to show the EU in favourable light.

3 Measuring EU identification: data and methods

3.1 Indicators and sources

This report draws on data from recent Standard Eurobarometer surveys to describe and compare the differences in attitudes to EU identification across Europe. Eurobarometer surveys are public opinion surveys that are conducted regularly on behalf of the European Commission since 1973. These surveys address a wide variety of topical issues relating to the European Union throughout the EU Member States.

The surveys are conducted by TNS Opinion on behalf of the European Commission, Directorate General Communication (Strategy, Corporate Communication Actions and Eurobarometer Unit). Eurobarometer results are published by the European Commission's Directorate-General Communication. The Standard Eurobarometer was established in 1974. Each survey consists of approximately 1000 face-to-face interviews per country. Standard Eurobarometer reports are published twice yearly.²

The Standard Eurobarometer survey series is a cross-national study of trends within Member States of the European Union. The Eurobarometer survey is carried out each autumn and spring. Although the range of questions has been expanded over the years, the programme aims to keep most of the survey constant, so that data is comparable over time. Starting with in 1990, separate supplementary surveys on special topics have been conducted under almost every Eurobarometer wave. Special irregularly repeated modules investigate topics such as agriculture, biotechnology, consumer behaviour, elderly people, energy, environment, family, gender issues, health, immigration, poverty, regional identity, science and technology, urban traffic and working conditions from a European perspective.

The primary data from all the Eurobarometer surveys as well as the accompanying documentation are available to the scientific community for research and training

² <http://ec.europa.eu/COMMFrontOffice/PublicOpinion/>

purposes. These materials are stored and curated by the GESIS data archive (formerly known as the Central Archive for Empirical Social Research) and the Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR).

Two sorts of questions from the Eurobarometer surveys are used to construct a typology of EU identification in this report. The first of these questions relates to public opinions about EU's image³; the second relates to attachment to the European Union⁴. Although questions concerning the EU's image appear regularly in Eurobarometer surveys, fewer waves contain questions on attachment to the European Union. For the purpose of the typology developed in this study, regionally coded waves of the Eurobarometer survey from the latest available year (2015) were used:

- Eurobarometer 84.4 November - December 2015 for EU image;
- Eurobarometer 84.3 November 2015 for both EU image and attachment to the EU;
- Eurobarometer 84.1 September 2015 for both EU image and attachment to the EU.

3.2 Research methods and analysis techniques

In the first step, separate typologies of EU image and attachment to the EU were built. This was done by classifying the regions into categories based on the predominant responses to the Eurobarometer survey questions on EU image and attachment to the EU.

Subsequently, in order to build a composite typology of EU identification, plotting EU image and attachment to EU variables, hierarchical cluster analysis was used. Cluster analysis (see e.g. Gore Jr., 2000) is a method that allows for exploring complex data sets in search for homogenous grouping of objects based on multivariate similarity. Thus, it is widely used across various disciplines to build classification systems or typologies. The hierarchical method for cluster analysis allows for identifying a hierarchy of nested clusters that can be represented graphically in a tree structure. In this particular case, a decision was made to identify five clusters, striking a balance between the accuracy of clustering and legibility of the typology.

Both the two single-variable typologies and the regional composite typology of EU identification present some limitations, which need to be acknowledged. First, in the case of the typologies of EU image and attachment to the EU, while offering a useful categorisation along those respective variables, these typologies are based on arbitrary decisions that had to be made to define the boundaries between the types. This invites caution in interpreting the differences between the types, which in some cases were not particularly marked.

In both kinds of typologies also there are limitations stemming from the data set. Firstly, the Eurobarometer surveys used have coded responses for different NUTS levels across the EU Member States covered. Thus, in cases where data was coded on the NUTS 1 level (United

³ The question about EU image is typically phrased (in the local language) as follows: "In general, does the EU conjure up for you a very positive, fairly positive, neutral, fairly negative or very negative image?".

⁴ The question about EU attachment is typically phrased (in the local language) as follows: "Please tell me how attached you feel to the European Union (very attached, fairly attached, not very attached, not at all attached)".

Kingdom, Germany, Italy) this data needed to be disaggregated to NUTS 2 level for the sake of comparability. Conversely, in cases where the surveys covered NUTS 3 regions (Ireland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Croatia), the data had to be aggregated up to NUTS 2 level. Secondly, in Eurobarometer surveys' the number of respondents in particular regions may be relatively small, which limits the validity of the data for the regional level. To mitigate this limitation, we have combined several waves of Eurobarometer surveys from the same year (2015) surveys covering the EU image (3 waves) and attachment to the EU (2 waves) questions to increase the sample size and validity.

4 Regional typology of EU identification: image of the EU versus attachment to Europe

4.1 EU identification

In the Eurobarometer surveys, interviewees are asked (in their local language) to express their current general opinion about EU image in terms of one of the following five options: (i) very positive; (ii) fairly positive; (iii) neutral; (iv) fairly negative; or (v) very negative. In this report, respondents selecting one of the first two options (i.e. very positive and fairly positive) or one of the last two options (i.e. fairly negative and very negative) have been clustered and represented in three maps below. The first of these (Fig. 4.1) illustrates the share of the population by region with a positive image of the EU (very positive or fairly positive). The second map (Fig. 4.2) illustrates the share of the population with a neutral or ambivalent image of the EU (neither positive nor negative). The third map (Fig. 4.3) illustrates the share of the population with a negative image of the EU (fairly negative or very negative).

Countries in which respondents consider the EU to have a positive image include Bulgaria, Croatia Ireland, Lithuania, Poland and Romania. Respondents from northern Italy, Sicily, northern Portugal and part of north-west Spain (Castilla y León) also consider that the EU has a more positive image. Regions in which fewer respondents consider the EU's image to be positive include central Austria, central France (Limousin), parts of east Germany (Chemnitz, Dresden, Leipzig, Sachsen-Anhalt), western Greece and northern England (Fig. 4.1).


Countries in which respondents have a neutral or ambivalent image of the EU include Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia and Slovenia. More than 40% of survey respondents in these countries consider the EU's image to be neutral. Similar proportions of respondents from parts of other countries also consider the EU to have a rather neutral image. These include northern England and Scotland, southern Spain, northern Sweden, western Denmark, much of the Netherlands, Belgium and Hungary (Fig. 4.2).

Regions in which high proportions of respondents consider the EU's image to be negative include western Austria, central Greece, south-west and east England and parts of the Czech Republic (Severozápad and Moravskoslezsko). More than 60% of respondents in these areas consider that the EU's image is negative (Fig. 4.3).

It is apparent from that there is substantial variation in views about the EU's image, not just between countries but also within them. Since there is no regional data for smaller countries these differences are only visible in the larger countries of the EU. Some substantial variations in opinions about EU image can be seen across countries such as Germany and Spain. In parts of east Germany, for example, few respondents consider the EU to have a positive image whereas many more respondents in the west of the country (in the Rhine-Ruhr area) consider the EU image to be positive. In Spain, a large proportion of survey respondents in Castilla y León consider the EU image to be positive especially when compared to respondents from neighbouring Extremadura where much fewer respondents share a similarly positive view about the EU's image.


Equally clear from the maps is that there are some regions in the EU where there are similar proportions of respondents holding quite opposing views about the EU's image. In other words, the population of these regions is divided in terms of its opinions about the EU's image. The regional polarisation of these views is presented in Fig 4.4. This figure illustrates that there are some regions in which a positive image of the EU prevails (e.g. Bulgaria, Croatia, Ireland, Romania) and others in which a negative image prevails (e.g. western Austria, western Greece, south-west England, Flevoland in the Netherlands, Thüringen in Germany and Nord-Pas-de-Calais in France). At the same time, the population of many regions consider the EU to have a fairly neutral image. Many respondents from swathes of regions from southern Spain to northern Finland consider the EU's image to be neutral (i.e. neither positive nor negative).

Fig. 4.1. Share of population with a positive image of the EU (%) at the regional level




Source: Authors' elaboration based on Eurobarometer data

Fig. 4.2. Share of population with a neutral image of the EU (%) at the regional level




Source: Authors' elaboration based on Eurobarometer data

Fig 4.3. Share of population with a negative image of the EU (%) at the regional level



Source: Authors' elaboration based on Eurobarometer data

Fig.4.4. Regional typology of EU image



Source: Authors' elaboration based on Eurobarometer data


In Eurobarometer surveys, interviewees are invited to express their general opinion about their attachment to the European Union in terms of one of the following four options: (i) very attached; (ii) fairly attached; (iii) not very attached; and (iv) not at all attached. In this report, respondents selecting one of the first two options (i.e. very attached and fairly attached) have been clustered. The findings are presented in three maps below. The first of these (Fig. 4.5) illustrates the share of the population by region which feels attached to the EU (very or fairly attached). The second (Fig. 4.6) illustrates the share of the population which feels less attached to the EU (not very attached). The third figure (Fig. 4.7) illustrates the proportion of population by region which considers itself to be not at all attached to the EU.

The regions in which higher numbers of respondents feel attachment to the EU include Latvia, northern Poland (Warmińsko-Mazurskie and Kujawsko-Pomorskie), north-east Romania (Nord-Est and Centru), northern Spain (Castilla y León and Aragón), northern France (Champagne-Ardenne, Île-de-France and Picardie), south-west Germany (Freiburg, Karlsruhe, Koblenz, Rheinhessen-Pfalz), western Hungary (Nyugat-Dunántúl). Regions in which many respondents do not feel attached to the EU include Cyprus, central Czech Republic, south-west England, northern Greece, southern Portugal (Alentejo and Algarve), and southern Spain (Murcia) (Fig. 4.7). Regions where only a low level of attachment to the

EU ('not very attached') is prevalent include Northern Ireland, southern Portugal, northern Finland, southern Austria, northern Greece.


These three maps about public attachment to the European Union also illustrate the diversity of opinions both between and within countries. Some substantial variations in opinions about attachment can be seen across some countries such as Germany and Spain. Despite relatively high proportions of respondents feeling attached to the EU (either very or fairly attached) in much of Germany, especially in the south-west (see above), respondents in certain regions such as Thüringen do not share this opinion. Similarly, in Spain, high proportions of respondents in much of the country feel attached to the EU (either very or fairly attached) but respondents in Comunidad Foral de Navarra and País Vasco do not share this level of attachment.

Fig.4.5. Share of population very and fairly attached to the EU (%) at the regional level




Source: Authors' elaboration based on Eurobarometer data

Fig. 4.6. Share of population not very attached to the EU (%) at the regional level




Source: Authors' elaboration based on Eurobarometer data

Fig.4.7. Share of population not at all attached to the EU (%) at the regional level



Source: Authors' elaboration based on Eurobarometer data

Fig. 4.8. Regional typology of attachment to the EU



Source: Authors' elaboration based on Eurobarometer data

4.2 EU identification regional typology

In the next step, hierarchical cluster analysis allowed for distinguishing five distinctive regional types of EU identification, combining EU image and attachment to EU (see fig. below). The types are the following:

Negative: on average 23% of respondents had a positive image of the EU, 37% neutral, and 36% negative, with the latter being the differentiating value. This category corresponds to 31% of the overall sample of NUTS 2 regions. In this megatype one observed strong differentiation in terms of attachment to the EU, which led to distinguishing two regional types:

1.1 Negative-Neutral: in this type on average 30% declared to be attached to the EU, 41% not very attached (differentiating value), and 26% not at all attached. This type of region corresponds to 9.3% of the overall sample.

1.2 Negative-Attached: in this type on average 40% of respondents declared to be attached to the EU, 34% not very attached (differentiating value), and 22% not at all attached. This type of region corresponds to 21.7% of the overall sample.


Neutral: in this megatype on average 35% of respondents had a positive image of the EU, while 41% neutral (differentiating value), and 21% negative). This megatype corresponded to 55.4% of the sample of regions. Here as well the megatype had to be broken into two distinctive types of regions due to strong polarisation in terms of attachment to the EU:

2.1 Neutral-Attached: in this type of region on average 55% of respondents declared being attached to the EU (differentiating value), 31% not very attached, and 10% not at all attached. This type represents 33.3% of the overall sample.

2.2 Neutral-Neutral: in this type of region on average 42% of respondents declared being attached to the EU (differentiating value), 37% not very attached, 17% not at all attached). This type represents 22.1% of overall sample.


3. Positive: the final type is more homogenous in terms of EU image and attachment to the EU, with on average 47% of respondents declaring positive image of the EU, 39% neutral, and only 9% negative and on average 63% of respondents declaring being attached to the EU, 24% not very attached, and 9% not at all attached. This type corresponds to 13.6% of the overall sample.

Fig. 4.9. EU identification typology



Source: Authors

Fig. 4.10. EU identification typology map



Source: Authors' elaboration based on Eurobarometer data

The typology serves two purposes. Firstly, it provides the dependent variable (EU identification) for further statistical analysis to test the abovementioned hypotheses as well as for further research beyond COHESIFY. Secondly, as such, it provides valuable insights into the patterns in terms of how citizens across different regions perceive the EU. The above figure, mapping the types across the regions, clearly shows strong differentiation of EU identification across the EU's regions and allows identifying some trends.

Among regions with a predominantly negative image of the EU one observes polarisation on attachment to the EU, with twice as many of them being in the Negative – Attached category than in Negative – Neutral. The cluster analysis did not identify regions with predominance of both negative EU image and lack of attachment to the EU. One may thus speculate this indicates a dissonance between the variables, whereby negative perceptions of what the EU does do not go hand in hand with lack of attachment to the EU. In other

word, even in regions with a predominantly negative image of the EU, most citizens tend to identify with the EU or be neutral towards it. This dichotomy could be further explored and explained in future case study research.

From the observation of the map of the EU identification types one cannot advance any decisive claims on North-South patterns, that one could perhaps expect given the socio-economic determinants of EU identification and the economic disparities and differences in the impacts of the post-2008 crises across the North-South divide. In fact, Negative-Neutral type, while scarce generally, can be found both in the UK, unsurprisingly, but also the German Land of Thüringen, Austria's Kärnten or the French Limousin and Cyprus, not to mention the case of Greece where many regions fall into this category. Likewise, the Negative – Attached type of regions can be found across Europe, from Spain, Italy and Greece, to Czech Republic, Germany, Austria, and the UK and the Nordic countries. However, one can observe a predominance of the most positive image of the EU and strong attachment to the EU, thus the Positive type, in several of the former communist countries that have joined the EU in 2004 and 2007. Moreover, what emerges from the typology is also a predominance of Neutral – Attached and Neutral - Neutral types in former 'Cohesion Countries', with the exception of Greece (thus Ireland, Spain, Portugal) and in the rich central regions of the EU from The Netherlands, through Germany and France to Italy.

Another observation that the typology invites is that regions that have benefited from more substantial support from EU Cohesion policy, being qualified under Convergence or Phasing-out objectives in 2007-2013, and thus have had a greater exposure to its impacts, are not necessarily characterised by more positive EU identification. For instance, while in the Central-Eastern and South-Eastern Member States - that have seen a considerable investment supported by EU Cohesion policy, such as Poland, or Romania - positive regional type clearly predominates, with only a small minority of regions displaying both neutral image and neutral attachment to the EU. However, in other countries from that group like the Czech Republic, especially, there is a greater diversity of types, with some regions like Severozápad, bordering Germany, and Moravskoslezsko bordering Poland and Slovakia, being characterised by the most negative EU identification (Negative – Neutral), and the rest of the regions splitting between Neutral – Neutral type, where predominantly the image of the EU is neither good nor bad and people tend to be lukewarm in terms of attachment to the EU, and Negative – Positive type, where negative views on the EU prevail, but citizens nonetheless tend to be attached to the European integration project. In other parts of Europe where substantial EU funding was allocated, there is a great diversity of EU identification types, for instance in Spain one can find one case of a Positive type but not among former Convergence regions, that split between also Neutral – Neutral and Neutral – Positive. In Ireland, often given as an example of effective use of EU Structural Funds to promote regional development and bridge the economic disparities with the core EU economies, both regions fall into Neutral – Neutral type. Then, one cannot miss the case of the UK, whose citizens sent a strong anti-EU message by deciding to leave the EU in the 2016 referendum, with the predominance of negative image of the EU, albeit with differentiation on attachment to the EU and the solitary case of London being in the Positive category. Finally, the example of Greece is also striking, as despite the fact that its regions have been beneficiaries of substantial allocations from EU Structural Funds, there are six NUTS 2 regions in the Negative – Neutral type, which, however, could be related

with the tensions between Greece and the *Trojka* in the context of EU debt crisis, which affected Greece particularly strongly. All this may indicate that whether a region has been a significant beneficiary of EU funding hardly matters for its citizens' EU identification, which in turn suggests that other factors, for instance socio-economic ones, may be more important.

One is also struck by the fact that many of the border regions do not seem to exhibit any clear tendency towards the Positive type, as one could expect given the emphasis on the positive impacts of transnational experience on EU identification highlighted in the literature. In fact, many of the border regions, such as the Greek, Czech or Austrian ones are in the Negative – Neutral category.

The above observations open up exciting avenues for further investigation and require verification and statistical analysis to identify explanatory factors behind the regional patterns of EU identification. The selection of regional indicators and variables listed as well as the hypotheses advanced listed in this paper (section 2) will be used to shed some light on this issue.

5 EU identification in the COHESIFY case study countries



This section offers a focus on the EU identification types in the COHESIFY case study countries. Maps and tables below provide a classification of their regions with respect to the typology outlined in section 4.

5.1 Cyprus

Table 5.1. Cyprus – regional types

| NUTS 2 Code | Region | Type Code | Type |
|-------------|--------|-----------|--------------------|
| CY00 | Κύπρος | 11 | Negative - Neutral |

Fig. 5.1. EU identification regional typology in Cyprus



Source: Authors' elaboration based on Eurobarometer data



5.2 Germany

Table 5.2. Germany – regional types

| NUTS 2 Code | Region | Type Code | Type |
|-------------|------------|-----------|--------------------|
| DE11 | Stuttgart | 21 | Neutral - Attached |
| DE12 | Karlsruhe | 21 | Neutral - Attached |
| DE13 | Freiburg | 21 | Neutral - Attached |
| DE14 | Tübingen | 21 | Neutral - Attached |
| DE21 | Oberbayern | 21 | Neutral - Attached |

| | | | |
|------|------------------------|----|---------------------|
| DE22 | Niederbayern | 21 | Neutral - Attached |
| DE23 | Oberpfalz | 21 | Neutral - Attached |
| DE24 | Oberfranken | 21 | Neutral - Attached |
| DE25 | Mittelfranken | 21 | Neutral - Attached |
| DE26 | Unterfranken | 21 | Neutral - Attached |
| DE27 | Schwaben | 21 | Neutral - Attached |
| DE30 | Berlin | 21 | Neutral - Attached |
| DE40 | Brandenburg | 22 | Neutral - Neutral |
| DE50 | Bremen | 21 | Neutral - Attached |
| DE60 | Hamburg | 11 | Negative - Neutral |
| DE71 | Darmstadt | 21 | Neutral - Attached |
| DE72 | Gießen | 21 | Neutral - Attached |
| DE73 | Kassel | 21 | Neutral - Attached |
| DE80 | Mecklenburg-Vorpommern | 22 | Neutral - Neutral |
| DE91 | Braunschweig | 21 | Neutral - Attached |
| DE92 | Hannover | 21 | Neutral - Attached |
| DE93 | Lüneburg | 21 | Neutral - Attached |
| DE94 | Weser-Ems | 21 | Neutral - Attached |
| DEA1 | Düsseldorf | 21 | Neutral - Attached |
| DEA2 | Köln | 21 | Neutral - Attached |
| DEA3 | Münster | 21 | Neutral - Attached |
| DEA4 | Detmold | 21 | Neutral - Attached |
| DEA5 | Arnsberg | 21 | Neutral - Attached |
| DEB1 | Koblenz | 21 | Neutral - Attached |
| DEB2 | Trier | 21 | Neutral - Attached |
| DEB3 | Rheinhessen-Pfalz | 21 | Neutral - Attached |
| DECo | Saarland | 21 | Neutral - Attached |
| DED2 | Dresden | 12 | Negative - Attached |
| DED4 | Chemnitz | 12 | Negative - Attached |
| DED5 | Leipzig | 12 | Negative - Attached |
| DEEo | Sachsen-Anhalt | 12 | Negative - Attached |
| DEFo | Schleswig-Holstein | 21 | Neutral - Attached |
| DEGo | Thüringen | 11 | Negative - Neutral |

Fig. 5.2. EU identification regional typology in Germany




Source: Authors' elaboration based on Eurobarometer data


5.3 Greece

Table 5.3. Greece – regional types

| NUTS 2 Code | Region | Type Code | Type |
|-------------|----------------------------|-----------|---------------------|
| EL11 | Ανατολική Μακεδονία, Θράκη | 21 | Neutral - Attached |
| EL12 | Κεντρική Μακεδονία | 11 | Negative - Neutral |
| EL13 | Δυτική Μακεδονία | 21 | Neutral - Attached |
| EL14 | Θεσσαλία | 12 | Negative - Attached |
| EL21 | Ήπειρος | 11 | Negative - Neutral |
| EL22 | Ιόνια Νησιά | - | - |
| EL23 | Δυτική Ελλάδα | 11 | Negative - Neutral |
| EL24 | Στερεά Ελλάδα | 11 | Negative - Neutral |
| EL25 | Πελοπόννησος | 11 | Negative - Neutral |
| EL30 | Αττική | 11 | Negative - Neutral |
| EL41 | Βόρειο Αιγαίο | - | - |
| EL42 | Νότιο Αιγαίο | - | - |
| EL43 | Κρήτη | 12 | Negative - Attached |

Fig. 5.3 EU identification regional typology in Greece







Source: Authors' elaboration based on Eurobarometer data

5.4 Hungary

Table 5.4. Hungary – Regional types

| NUTS 2 Code | Region | Type Code | Type |
|-------------|--------------------|-----------|--------------------|
| HU10 | Közép-Magyarország | 21 | Neutral - Attached |
| HU21 | Közép-Dunántúl | 21 | Neutral - Attached |
| HU22 | Nyugat-Dunántúl | 31 | Positive |
| HU23 | Dél-Dunántúl | 21 | Neutral - Attached |
| HU31 | Észak-Magyarország | 31 | Positive |
| HU32 | Észak-Alföld | 21 | Neutral - Attached |
| HU33 | Dél-Alföld | 31 | Positive |

Fig. 5.4. EU identification regional typology in Hungary




Source: Authors' elaboration based on Eurobarometer data

5.5 Ireland

Table 5.5. Ireland – Regional types

| NUTS 2 Code | Region | Type Code | Type |
|-------------|-----------------------------|-----------|-------------------|
| IEo1 | Border, Midland and Western | 22 | Neutral - Neutral |
| IEo2 | Southern and Eastern | 22 | Neutral - Neutral |

Fig. 5.5. EU identification regional typology in Ireland



Source: Authors' elaboration based on Eurobarometer data

5.6 Italy


Table 5.6. Italy – Regional types

| NUTS 2 Code | Region | Type Code | Type |
|-------------|------------------------------|-----------|-------------------|
| ITC1 | Piemonte | 22 | Neutral - Neutral |
| ITC2 | Valle d'Aosta/Vallée d'Aoste | 22 | Neutral - Neutral |
| ITC3 | Liguria | 22 | Neutral - Neutral |
| ITC4 | Lombardia | 22 | Neutral - Neutral |

| | | | |
|------|-------------------------------------|----|---------------------|
| ITF1 | Abruzzo | 22 | Neutral - Neutral |
| ITF2 | Molise | 22 | Neutral - Neutral |
| ITF3 | Campania | 22 | Neutral - Neutral |
| ITF4 | Puglia | 22 | Neutral - Neutral |
| ITF5 | Basilicata | 22 | Neutral - Neutral |
| ITF6 | Calabria | 22 | Neutral - Neutral |
| ITG1 | Sicilia | 22 | Neutral - Neutral |
| ITG2 | Sardegna | 22 | Neutral - Neutral |
| ITH1 | Provincia Autonoma di Bolzano/Bozen | 22 | Neutral - Neutral |
| ITH2 | Provincia Autonoma di Trento | 22 | Neutral - Neutral |
| ITH3 | Veneto | 22 | Neutral - Neutral |
| ITH4 | Friuli-Venezia Giulia | 22 | Neutral - Neutral |
| ITH5 | Emilia-Romagna | 22 | Neutral - Neutral |
| ITI1 | Toscana | 12 | Negative - Attached |
| ITI2 | Umbria | 12 | Negative - Attached |
| ITI3 | Marche | 12 | Negative - Attached |

Fig. 5.6. EU identification regional typology in Italy






Source: Authors' elaboration based on Eurobarometer data

5.7 The Netherlands

Table 5.7. The Netherlands – Regional types


| NUTS 2 Code | Region | Type Code | Type |
|-------------|----------------|-----------|---------------------|
| NL11 | Groningen | 12 | Negative - Attached |
| NL12 | Friesland (NL) | 22 | Neutral - Neutral |
| NL13 | Drenthe | 22 | Neutral - Neutral |
| NL21 | Overijssel | 12 | Negative - Attached |
| NL22 | Gelderland | 22 | Neutral - Neutral |
| NL23 | Flevoland | 12 | Negative - Attached |
| NL31 | Utrecht | 22 | Neutral - Neutral |
| NL32 | Noord-Holland | 22 | Neutral - Neutral |
| NL33 | Zuid-Holland | 12 | Negative - Attached |
| NL34 | Zeeland | 12 | Negative - Attached |
| NL41 | Noord-Brabant | 22 | Neutral - Neutral |
| NL42 | Limburg (NL) | 21 | Neutral - Attached |

Fig. 5.7. EU identification regional typology in The Netherlands



EU Image

Attachment to EU



Source: Authors' elaboration based on Eurobarometer data


5.8 Poland


Table 5.8. Poland – Regional types

| NUTS 2 Code | Region | Type Code | Type |
|-------------|-------------|-----------|----------|
| PL11 | Łódzkie | 31 | Positive |
| PL12 | Mazowieckie | 31 | Positive |
| PL21 | Małopolskie | 31 | Positive |

| | | | |
|------|---------------------|----|-------------------|
| PL22 | Śląskie | 31 | Positive |
| PL31 | Lubelskie | 31 | Positive |
| PL32 | Podkarpackie | 31 | Positive |
| PL33 | Świętokrzyskie | 22 | Neutral - Neutral |
| PL34 | Podlaskie | 22 | Neutral - Neutral |
| PL41 | Wielkopolskie | 31 | Positive |
| PL42 | Zachodniopomorskie | 31 | Positive |
| PL43 | Lubuskie | 22 | Neutral - Neutral |
| PL51 | Dolnośląskie | 31 | Positive |
| PL52 | Opolskie | 31 | Positive |
| PL61 | Kujawsko-Pomorskie | 31 | Positive |
| PL62 | Warmińsko-Mazurskie | 31 | Positive |
| PL63 | Pomorskie | 31 | Positive |

Fig. 5.8. EU identification regional typology in Poland







Source: Authors' elaboration based on Eurobarometer data

5.9 Romania

Table 5.9. Romania – Regional types

| NUTS 2 Code | Region | Type Code | Type |
|-------------|-------------------|-----------|-------------------|
| RO11 | Nord-Vest | 31 | Positive |
| RO12 | Centru | 31 | Positive |
| RO21 | Nord-Est | 31 | Positive |
| RO22 | Sud-Est | 22 | Neutral - Neutral |
| RO31 | Sud - Muntenia | 31 | Positive |
| RO32 | Bucureşti - Ilfov | 31 | Positive |
| RO41 | Sud-Vest Oltenia | 31 | Positive |
| RO42 | Vest | 31 | Positive |

Fig.5.9. EU identification regional typology in Romania





Source: Authors' elaboration based on Eurobarometer data

5.10 Slovenia

Table 5.10. Slovenia – Regional types

| NUTS 2 Code | Region | Type Code | Type |
|-------------|-------------------|-----------|--------------------|
| Slo1 | Vzhodna Slovenija | 22 | Neutral - Neutral |
| Slo2 | Zahodna Slovenija | 21 | Neutral - Attached |

Fig.5.10. EU identification regional typology in Slovenia



Source: Authors' elaboration based on Eurobarometer data

5.11 Spain


Table 5.11. Spain – Regional types

| NUTS 2 Code | Region | Type Code | Type |
|-------------|------------------------|-----------|---------------------|
| ES11 | Galicia | 21 | Neutral - Attached |
| ES12 | Principado de Asturias | 21 | Neutral - Attached |
| ES13 | Cantabria | 31 | Positive |
| ES21 | País Vasco | 12 | Negative - Attached |

| | | | |
|------|----------------------------|----|---------------------|
| ES22 | Comunidad Foral de Navarra | 12 | Negative - Attached |
| ES23 | La Rioja | - | - |
| ES24 | Aragón | 21 | Neutral - Attached |
| ES30 | Comunidad de Madrid | 31 | Positive |
| ES41 | Castilla y León | 31 | Positive |
| ES42 | Castilla-La Mancha | 21 | Neutral - Attached |
| ES43 | Extremadura | 21 | Neutral - Attached |
| ES51 | Cataluña | 21 | Neutral - Attached |
| ES52 | Comunidad Valenciana | 21 | Neutral - Attached |
| ES53 | Illes Balears | 31 | Positive |
| ES61 | Andalucía | 22 | Neutral - Neutral |
| ES62 | Región de Murcia | 22 | Neutral - Neutral |
| ES63 | Ciudad Autónoma de Ceuta | - | - |
| ES64 | Ciudad Autónoma de Melilla | - | - |
| ES70 | Canarias | 21 | Neutral - Attached |

Fig. 5.11. EU identification regional typology in Spain





Source: Authors' elaboration based on Eurobarometer data



5.12 United Kingdom

Table 5.12. United Kingdom – Regional types

| NUTS 2 Code | Region | Type Code | Type |
|-------------|--|-----------|---------------------|
| UKC1 | Tees Valley and Durham | 12 | Negative - Attached |
| UKC2 | Northumberland and Tyne and Wear | 12 | Negative - Attached |
| UKD1 | Cumbria | 12 | Negative - Attached |
| UKD3 | Greater Manchester | 12 | Negative - Attached |
| UKD4 | Lancashire | 12 | Negative - Attached |
| UKD6 | Cheshire | 12 | Negative - Attached |
| UKD7 | Merseyside | 12 | Negative - Attached |
| UKE1 | East Yorkshire and Northern Lincolnshire | 12 | Negative - Attached |
| UKE2 | North Yorkshire | 12 | Negative - Attached |
| UKE3 | South Yorkshire | 12 | Negative - Attached |
| UKE4 | West Yorkshire | 12 | Negative - Attached |
| UKF1 | Derbyshire and Nottinghamshire | 12 | Negative - Attached |
| UKF2 | Leicestershire, Rutland and Northamptonshire | 12 | Negative - Attached |
| UKF3 | Lincolnshire | 12 | Negative - Attached |
| UKG1 | Herefordshire, Worcestershire and Warwickshire | 12 | Negative - Attached |
| UKG2 | Shropshire and Staffordshire | 12 | Negative - Attached |

| | | | |
|------|--|----|---------------------|
| UKG3 | West Midlands | 12 | Negative - Attached |
| UKH1 | East Anglia | 12 | Negative - Attached |
| UKH2 | Bedfordshire and Hertfordshire | 12 | Negative - Attached |
| UKH3 | Essex | 12 | Negative - Attached |
| UKI1 | Inner London | 31 | Positive |
| UKI2 | Outer London | 31 | Positive |
| UKJ1 | Berkshire, Buckinghamshire and Oxfordshire | 11 | Negative - Neutral |
| UKJ2 | Surrey, East and West Sussex | 11 | Negative - Neutral |
| UKJ3 | Hampshire and Isle of Wight | 11 | Negative - Neutral |
| UKJ4 | Kent | 11 | Negative - Neutral |
| UKK1 | Gloucestershire, Wiltshire and Bristol/Bath area | 11 | Negative - Neutral |
| UKK2 | Dorset and Somerset | 11 | Negative - Neutral |
| UKK3 | Cornwall and Isles of Scilly | 11 | Negative - Neutral |
| UKK4 | Devon | 11 | Negative - Neutral |
| UKL1 | West Wales and The Valleys | 12 | Negative - Attached |
| UKL2 | East Wales | 12 | Negative - Attached |
| UKM2 | Eastern Scotland | 12 | Negative - Attached |
| UKM3 | South Western Scotland | 12 | Negative - Attached |
| UKM5 | North Eastern Scotland | 12 | Negative - Attached |
| UKM6 | Highlands and Islands | 12 | Negative - Attached |
| UKNo | Northern Ireland | 22 | Neutral - Neutral |

Fig. 5.12. EU identification regional typology in the United Kingdom



Source: Authors' elaboration based on Eurobarometer data

6 Next steps: testing the hypotheses

This output paper explored and classified the variables on the potential regional characteristics that may affect the patterns of perceptions of the EU across the highly differentiated European regions, with the aim to formulate a set of hypotheses on the regional determinants of EU identification. Moreover, the paper presented the regional typology of EU identification, which provides a data set and a dependent variable for testing these hypotheses. Hence, this work prepared ground for further statistical analysis to shed more light on which regional features actually matter when it comes to citizens' views on European integration, to be carried out as part of COHESIFY (Output 2.4b).

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